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de-radicalisation

I’m quoted in this week’s Economist talking about the need to enhance resources for disengagement and de-radicalisation programmes for those returning from Syria. The contrast with other European countries, such as Germany, Denmark and Sweden, is stark – and we need to catch up quick.

I’ve written about this at more length for HuffPo.

I was quoted in a piece for Canadian media outlet CBC on 3 November, talking about the need for structured and well financed de-radicalisation, disengagement and exit programmes. Those who want to leave violent extremist groups are ‘low hanging fruit’ – they want out, we need to help them out to ensure they don’t end up back in the hands of a fresh set of recruiters. We can either help them, or have them remain a threat to our safety.

Here is a link to the article by Andre Mayer.

There are growing reports that British jihadis fighting in Syria want to come home; it has been claimed that dozens are trapped in Syria unable to leave, and up to 100 are stranded in Turkey having made it out of Syria, but worried or unable to come back to the UK.

This should be no surprise.

Many will be scared for their safety; British jihadis are now being killed at a rate of one every three weeks. The latest fatality was reported this weekend; Muhammad Mehdi Hassan from Portsmouth was just 19 years old and had travelled to Syria with a group of friends. Of the six that went, four are now dead, one remains in Syria and one is in prison in the UK.

Others will be disillusioned. The actions of ISIS – including the horrific murder of four western hostages – paint a picture of a group of blood thirsty, evil barbarians. This is undoubtedly true of many, for whom legal redress feels like a wholly inadequate way of achieving justice for their victims.

There will also be a sizeable minority fighting with ISIS who did not sign up for this kind of terror. Some will have gone there originally on humanitarian grounds and been radicalized along the way. Others will have joined the struggle against Assad, but now find themselves fighting fellow Muslims and murdering innocent people, including women and children.

There will even be those who went explicitly to join ISIS but are appalled by the depths of depravity to which the organization sinks.

Given the truly heinous actions of ISIS, it is not surprising that the UK government’s response to the rise of British foreign fighters has been so firm and resolute, looking to ban them from returning to the UK, prosecute those who do come back, and even considering the use of treason laws for the most extreme cases.

While those guilty of crimes must be held accountable, this blanket response misses important opportunities that could strengthen -not weaken – national security.

First, those that return are likely to offer intelligence and insight to improve our understanding of ISIS, a group that has so far out-paced security experts at every turn.

Second, refusing re-entry to scared and disillusioned ISIS members is likely to make enemies of them for life. The testimonies of former violent extremists point to the uncomfortable truth that for many, unexpected acts of kindness from government officials created a chink of doubt that was part of their de-radicalisation process. We should be competing for their loyalty, not leaving them to fall into the hands of yet another set of violent extremist recruiters.

Third, what is more effective in countering ISIS propaganda than a returned foreign fighter who has seen the error of their ways and can speak to the horrors of what ISIS is doing? As the former head of counter-terrorism at MI6 said, “Many of the people who have been most successful in undermining the terrorist narrative are themselves ex-extremists,” adding that they can “explain why going abroad to fight is a very bad idea”. The success of networks such as Against Violent Extremism (AVE) underlines this point.

The UK government needs to add two new elements to its policy to tackle foreign fighters and the rise of ISIS.

First, it should establish a clearing house near the Syrian border in Turkey to process and return home scared and disillusioned British jihadis. Most will be trapped, having had their passports, mobile phones and credit cards confiscated by ISIS.

In support of this effort, it should run an information campaign within Syria to inform British ISIS members of their return options. This does not mean letting criminals off the hook; those guilty of crimes must be prosecuted on their return. But balanced messaging might just convince some to return home to face justice, rather than opt for a life on the run with a terrorist organization.

Second, the government should set up a national EXIT programme, similar to those operating in Denmark, Sweden and Germany. The Channel Programme targets individuals in the pre-criminal space, but needs to be complemented by a national programme aimed at those who have been radicalized and recruited and want to leave terrorist or violent extremist movement.

Such a scheme should offer a wider range of services than Channel, such as support for post-traumatic stress disorder, medical treatment for physical injuries sustained on the battlefield, de-radicalisation sessions, as well as help reintegrating into the family and wider community and access to education, employment and training.

It should also offer advice and guidance to the parents of foreign fighters, many of whom remain in contact with their children via phone, email or social media channels. In these exchanges, they become de-facto negotiators, desperately trying to keep lines of communication open and hoping to convince their son or daughter to come home. There is already evidence pointing to the effectiveness of these programmes.

The situation in Syria is heartbreaking on every level; innocent lives lost, tortured or brutalized; the destruction of a once thriving middle income country; the corruption of a faith; young people drawn to ISIS’s perverse ideology; and the knock-on impact of instability across the wider region. And as events last week in Canada remind us, there is also the risk of the threat coming home to the UK.

The government is right to take a firm stand against ISIS and those who fight in its ranks or support from the sidelines. But we need to face facts: we cannot stop British jihadis returning home; we cannot arrest our way out of the problem; and we do not have the resources to mount surveillance operations against all returning foreign fighters.

Instead, we need a more nuanced approach to deal with the different levels of threat. Arrest and prosecute those who have committed a crime and set an example of those guilty of the most heinous offences. Work proactively to bring back those who are scared and disillusioned, so they come back with us and on our terms. Turn the stories of returned foreign fighters into ammunition against ISIS. And offer those capable of reintegration the support they and their families need to get back on their feet and become productive members of society.

Tough measures are reassuring in the face of a threat such as ISIS. But they usually obscure the most promising opportunities to enhance our national security in the long-term.

This article was originally posted on Huffington Post on 27 October 2014.

A report on the Today Programme this morning spoke to young women in Luton thinking about travelling to Syria. So, are there more women travelling? What will they do when they get there? And is there anything that can be done to prevent them leaving? How does this challenge relate to the wider goals of prevention in relation to foreign fighters in Syria?

The war in Syria

It is now over three years since violence erupted in Syria. The statistics of the casualties are heart breaking. Over 146,000 people have lost their lives – someone dies every 10 minutes. The number of displaced children has more than tripled in the last year from 920,000 to 3 million – every 2 minutes, eight children in Syria are forced to flee their homes, raising concerns for this lost generation that struggles to find food, access to health care or psychological support and is going without schooling. Every minute, 3 Syrians become refugees abroad; 2.5 million have sought refuge outside the country, 1.5 million doing so in the last year alone.

These statistics are not just cold numbers; the growth of social media means that images and videos showing the horror of events on the ground are reaching bedrooms, living rooms and offices across the west. They are affecting us all, breaking our hearts on a daily basis as we see the lives of ordinary families being torn apart. A recent campaign video from Save the Children reminded us of what it would be like to have those horrors closer to home.

Syria as a radicalizing force

It is therefore not surprising that many of us are radicalized by what we see. I, for one, am left angry and heart broken, and wondering what I can do to help. We are frustrated that – yet again – our politicians and institutions are late to the table and full of grand gestures and platitudes rather than workable solutions. While the United Nations commissioned papers and the members of the Permanent Security Council wrangled over the wordings of resolutions, the people of Syria starve, face abuse, live in fear of death, and are forced to flee their homes.

The rise in western ‘foreign fighters’

Growing numbers of westerners are turning their anger into action. They are motivated by a range of things and do not necessarily go to Syria with the express aim of fighting on the side of terrorist groups, such as ISIS or al Nusra. A number of reasons emerge from those who have travelled; a desire to alleviate suffering; a duty to fight to assist Muslims who are oppressed; a desire for action and adventure; engagement in sectarian conflict; and underlying identity issues at home that leave them marginalized and powerless.

According to the ICSR, Western Europeans now represent almost one-fifth (18 per cent) of the so-called ‘foreign fighter’ population in Syria, with most recruits coming from France, the UK, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands.

A recent report by the Soufan Group stated that, on average, 6 per cent of foreign fighters from EU countries are converts, many are second or third generation immigrants and very few have prior connection with Syria.

The current mobilization is more significant than for every other instance of foreign fighter mobilization since the Afghanistant war in the 1980s. Although conflicts like Iraq, Somalia and Afghanistan went on for much longer, none of those conflicts mobilised as many foreigners as Syria in the same period of time. Indeed, for a number of smaller countries – Denmark and Belgium, for example – the number of residents that have gone to fight in Syria may already exceed the combined total for all previous conflicts.

Women travelling to Syria

There have been growing concerns about the number of women travelling to Syria. Most recently, Zahra and Salma Halane, 16 year old twin girls from Manchester, who are believed to have travelled to Syria.

This appears to be part of a growing and significant trend; almost one-fifth (18 per cent) of those travelling to Syria from the EU are women and the ICSR says that it is monitoring 40 women who have travelled to Syria, including at least 8 who are British.

Most accounts of these women place them as supporting and facilitating the actions of male fighters, whether as wives and mothers – for instance many travel with their husbands, maintaining the home, delivering first aid, or as women wishing to conduct ‘sexual jihad’ of which there have been sporadic reports.

There is less evidence of them performing a combative role, although there are various images circulating online of just that. And we must assume that – now or at some point in the future – it is inevitable that some will perform this function, as women have in other similar conflicts around the world. This is a truth that challenges, not just our age old gender stereotypes, but in particular society’s view of Muslim women as submissive and subservient to men within their homes and communities, something that is rarely a reality for Muslims living in the west.

Prevention is better than cure

Today’s report hears from women who dismiss the role of community leaders in influencing their opinions. These are women who are active media consumers and take their cues from a variety of sources, as we all do these days; most news content is now shared and accessed via social media platforms, such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube. And research from the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) showed that Muslim media consumption habits are similar to non-Muslims, dispelling the myth of segregated consumption patterns.

This means that there is an opportunity to compete to reach young men and women angry about what they see happening in Syria before they make the decision to travel. There have been a handful of attempts to do this. A recent police campaign focused on informing those wishing to travel of the legal implications of doing so, the practical challenges of doing so safely, and offered alternatives for those wanting to make a difference. But the women featured in Today’s piece had not heard of the campaign, highlighting the challenge of getting your message to the right ears and ensuring they hear it. This does not mean we should see the campaign as a failure and give up; rather we should amplify and scale up.

There is also an urgent need to compete with violent extremists for the attention of our young people. Extensive social media analysis conducted by my team at ISD reveals that there is almost no counter-narrative activity occurring online. There is no shortage of talk at expensive international conferences about the need for counter-narratives, but there is very little action. Governments are on safe and familiar ground funding meetings, but struggle to get effective counter-messaging campaigns signed off by risk-averse Ministers.

There are notable exceptions. For example, Abdullah-X has been developed by a London-based community worker committed to pushing back on violent extremist messaging, one of whose most successful videos focuses on considerations for Muslims thinking about travelling to Syria. This 2-minute animation was watched by over 6,000 people in a 6-week pilot campaign, in which ISD was involved in its role as co-chair of the European Commission’s working group on Internet radicalization. At the time of writing, it had been seen over 10,000 times. The next installment is out this week.

Frustrated by the lack of action, my team at ISD has turned itself into a counter-narrative innovation hub, creating content, working with partners to disseminate it to the right audiences, and using social media analytics to understand what works so these lessons can be applied by us and our community-based partners. The Autumn will see ISD launch a major counter-narrative campaign in Canada based on short films telling the stories of individuals touched by violent extremism, and similar campaigns will follow in the UK, Germany and Hungary in 2015. We are also talent spotting creative messengers who will dock into our technology platform to benefit from the campaigns and analytics experience we have built up.

As it currently stands, extremists have won the war of content and ideas online; they are organized, professional and prolific. In contrast, we are patchy, amateurish and unsystematic. If we want those thinking of travelling to Syria to come across a range of competing views, we need to do something about this. And fast. As the young women told the BBC reporter, they do not listen to community leaders.

What to do with the people returning from Syria?

We have still not seen individuals return from Syria in large numbers, and there has only been one documented case of a returnee committing an attack in Europe; a French lone actor who attacked a Jewish centre in Belgium, killing three.

Studies of previous conflicts show that most western jihadists prefer foreign fighting, but a minority do return to commit attacks at home in the west, approximately one in nine. This is a small proportion of all foreign fighters, but means that being a foreign fighter is a high risk factor for becoming a domestic fighter. The presence of foreign fighters also increases the effectiveness of those attacks; the presence of a veteran increases by a factor of roughly 1.5 the probability that a plot will come to execution and it doubles the likelihood that the plot will kill people.

Even when those returning have not fought, there is the risk that the effects of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) will make them vulnerable to radicalization once they return home.

Law enforcement is an essential tool for those returning who have broken the law. It is right that they are arrested and brought to justice, where they have joined terrorist groups to fight or been involved in the facilitation of those networks and their activities. But used too bluntly, the law will act play into the hands of extremists and will also drive a wedge between the police and communities at a time at which that relationship is critical as an early warning and prevention mechanism to prevent young people from travelling to Syria.

Government must invest in targeted and practical interventions to support those returning who have not broken the law and do not pose an immediate threat, and so will not find themselves within the criminal justice system or under surveillance by the intelligence agencies. These individuals – more likely to be women or those involved in humanitarian relief who are vulnerable to PTSD – need a range of social and therapeutic services to deal with the psychological impacts of their experiences, which might otherwise leave them vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment. Germany’s Hayat programme is an example of how this can be delivered.

Conclusion

The challenge of foreign fighters is of course not new, but the scale and speed of recruitment into Syria is causing concern in countries across Europe. That there appear to be growing numbers of women joining should not be surprising. Less is known about what the women are doing when they arrive, with much focus to date on their role as supporters and facilitators. But we can only assume that they will make their way to the frontline, as they have in many previous conflict zones.

There have been limited attempts to date to prevent young people from leaving. There are notable exceptions, such as those outlined in this article, but we are very much on the back foot and need to act quickly and decisively if we are to stand any chance of making up lost ground. Government agencies need to build bridges with communities and communicate more often and more loudly on the dangers of travel and alternative responses. We also need to get serious about competing for the attention of young people online. As it stands now, the extremists have won the wars of content and ideas online. We need to stop talking and start doing in the realm of counter-narratives so that young people hear from competing views before they make up their minds.

Finally, we need to start planning now for what happens when people start to return from Syria. The numbers far outweigh what we have seen in previous conflicts, which means there is a very real danger of overwhelming our existing services. There is simply not the manpower to arrest our way out of the problem, and putting all returnees under surveillance would bring our intelligence agencies to their knees. We therefore need a range of alternative community-based solutions for those who pose the least risk, both to ensure they do not go on to be a security threat to society, but also to help them return to some semblance of normal life and become functioning members of society here in the UK.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Abderrozak Benarabe is also known as Big A. He’s a gangster from Denmark who turned his back on a life of crime after his brother’s cancer diagnosis, turning to Islam and then, eventually, jihad in Syria.

European Jihadi follows Big A from the streets of Copenhagen to Syria and back again. Directed by Nagieb Khaja, it shows how adventure is the motive for some who find themselves on the frontline.

Following his Syrian commanders around wearing a grey t-shirt, khaki shorts and pumps, he looks more like a tourist that wandered into a war zone by mistake than a battle-ready combatant. He is a man out of place and out of his depth; no longer the big gangster fish in a criminal pond.

When he first arrives, the battalion does not have enough guns to go around and he complains, saying that he will tell the commander he’ll go home if he doesn’t see any action. After a number of men are killed in a shoot out, he finally gets his gun, and a smile creeps over his face as he takes it. In contrast, the faces of his Syrian companions are blank, a visible sense of emptiness hanging behind their eyes. These are men tired of the fighting. Some not even men.

After four days of fighting and bragging about his wealth back home, the commander tells Big A that he will be more useful back home in Denmark raising money than in Idlib fighting. He is furious.

Big A returns to Copenhagen, raises €67,000, and drives a mini bus full of medical and military supplies back to Syria. He is quite the big man showing off the night vision goggles and bullet proof vests he has smuggled over the Turkish border.

During his time in Copenhagen, Big A met up with his estranged daughter who asked why he was going to Syria. Surely, she asked, there were people closer to home that could benefit more from his help if he really wanted to put right his past misdemeanours. It’s not the same, he told her.

Cut to footage of Big A on a Danish beach. His version of reality was that he had to come home to sort out a turf war threatening his patch in Copenhagen. But this films paints a picture of a man in search of adventure for whom Syria was little more than a combat theme park; sulking until he got a gun; furious when asked to contribute off the battle field rather than on it; and whose commitment to the cause evaporated as soon as his status and revenue at home were at risk.

There are many theories about why Europeans are travelling to Syria. As ISIS declares itself a caliphate now known as IS and its leader speaks of furthering the Muslim cause, it is worth remembering that not all those who find themselves on the frontline have this kind of focus. Many will be young men and women, bored of life in Europe, in search of adventure. And like Big A, many could be dissuaded given the right deterrents and disincentives.

I’m pleased to be chairing an event in London organised by the Forgiveness Project on 28 April where the focus will be on how former extremists can use their own experiences to help tackle violent extremism.

Sharing their own personal journeys of moving away from extremism will be Tony McAleer, a former white supremacist and former organiser of the White Aryan Resistance in Canada and Hadiya Masieh, a former Islamic extremist who was recruited by Hizb ut-Tahrir radicals, until the 7/7 bombings changed her perspective.

I’m a passionate believer that the stories of former extremists are a credible counter-message to extremist propaganda and I’m working to create a global resource of testimonies through my work at the Institute for Strategic Dialogue and via the AVE network we run there.

More information about the event and tickets are available here.

My interest in security was sparked when I was at university and my beloved uncle Phil was kidnapped in Colombia. Suddenly, I was thrust into a world of private security companies and response consultants, and felt like an extra on a Hollywood movie set. It led me to ask a few basic questions: who had taken him? Why would they want him? How would we get him back? And, importantly, what could be done to help others who might suffer the same anguish as his family did for 7 long months?

I now dedicate part of my life to the final challenge – running a small charity called Hostage UK, which supports the families of hostages during a kidnap and the family and hostage post-release. We offer pastoral care, put the families in touch with others who have been through the same experience, provide them with any professional support they might need, and offer advice and guidance on how best they can cope with their experience.

When I am not running Hostage UK, I am Research and Policy Director at the Institute for Strategic Dialogue. There, I oversee our work on extremism and counter-terrorism, where – amongst other things – we have recently launched the Against Violent Extremism Network (AVE) to bring together former extremists with the survivors of violent extremist attacks to work to counter radicalization and help reintegrate extremists looking to leave their movements.

I have been reflecting on where these two worlds collide, and it strikes me that there are lessons to be learned from the reintegration of hostages and former extremists back into their family environments. I am not seeking to make light of the experiences of hostages, or draw parallels between their suffering and the choices of extremists. But if we look at the specific challenge of reintegration, there are some parallels. Here are five lessons that those looking to reintegrate former extremists could learn from our work at Hostage UK.

First, both the hostage and the family experience extreme forms of trauma. Hostages always say that their family experiences more stress than they do, because they always have the luxury of knowing whether they are alive or dead. When the hostage is released, the family is often not in a position to support fully, because they are in need of support themselves.

Second, the hostage and the family go through different experiences, and this can mean that they feel estranged from one another when the hostage returns.

Third, while the hostage has been away, the family has inevitably moved on. It is so often the main breadwinner who has been taken, and in their absence their wife (it is usually a female partner at home) has assumed the position of head of household, taken on responsibility for finances, and usurped the hostage’s role within the family. This can make reintegration difficult, as the hostage will not be able simply to slot back in and might feel excluded. It is mainly for this reason that there can be higher than average incidences of divorce post-release.

Fourth, the hostage may have experienced things during their captivity that they do not wish to share with their families due to a sense of shame and an inability to communicate. This only increases the sense of division between them and their family members.

Fifth, there is so often a reluctance on the part of both the former hostage and their family to accept that they might need help and support.

Applying these lessons across former hostages and former extremists may not be entirely intuitive. But it is vital to acknowledge that extremism – like kidnapping – is a human crime with a human solution, of which families must be a part. It is vital that these lessons are learned.

For more information about Hostage UK, visit our website.

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